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NOTES
SOME PROBLEMS IN THE EXECUTION OF WILLS
At common law the power of disposing of land by will
did not exist. This power was given by the statute of Henry
VIII, usually called the Statute of Wills. To make a good
will under that statute the only necessary solemnity was that
it should be in writing. Neither the signature of the testator
nor the attestation of witnesses was necessary, and "if it was
written from the mouth of the testator and by his direction,
though it was not shown or read to him afterwards, it would
be a valid will."'
The statutes of wills of the several states place very much
more stress on solemnities and formalities than did the orig-
inal English Statute of Wills. At present a will must be exe-
cuted according to these statutory requirements; otherwise it is
entirely void. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Georga
v. Busking2 held that the statutory requirements as prescribed
by the statute of 18003 had to be complied with before the
slaves, the subject of the devise, would pass. By that statute
it was enacted that slaves, so far as respects last wills, should
be held and devised as real estate, and should pass by last will
and testament in the same manner and under the same regula-
tions as landed property. The effect of that statute is, that a
will whidh would not pass land, would be insufficient to pass
slaves, and the court so held in the case cited. Thus it is seen
that the court in its first decisions on the question of formali-
ties was insistent upon an adherence to the terms of the stat-
ute. Although the court in requiring a strict compliance with
formalities has never upheld the letter of the statute at the ex-
pense of a testator who substantially complied with its terms,
yet the limits of that doctrine are well fixed. In a fairly re-
cent decision4 the Court of Appeals said, "We are aware of the
rule in this state that a substantial compliance with the stat-
ute is all that is required, but this rule cannot be extended so
as to dispense with an essential requirement of the statute
'Shanks v. Christopher, 3.A.K. M-arsh. 144 (1820).
215 T. B. Mon. 558.
2 2 St. L. 1546.
"Limbach v. Bolin, 169 Ky. 204, 183 U. S. 495 (1916).
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made for the purpose of preventing fraud either upon the
testator or those upon whom the law casts his property after
his death."
The statut& requires that the testator have a knowledge of
the contents of the will. But, as was held in Shanks v. Chris-
topher supra, there is a presumption of such knowledge from its
execution. The question as to the knowledge of the testator of
the contents of the will was the question for decision in Sechrest
v. Edwards.5 In that case the testator, who was illiterate and
could not read, furnished the draftsman with a previous will
which he had made, and directed him to write his will like that
which he submitted. The draftsman did so; and as he would
write a clause or paragraph he would read it to the testator,
who would approve what was written. In that way the whole
instrument was read to and approved by him. This was held
sufficient to show that the testator knew the contents of the
instrument. Under the state of fact no difficulties are encoun-
tered in agreeing to this decision. It is not even necessary
that the will should be read at all to the testator to render it
valid; his acknowledgment of the signature is evidence that he
has been informed of its contents.6
By the letter of the statute the signature is an essential re-
quisite of a will.7  The making of a mark is sufficient ;8 and it
is not essential to the validity of the will that it be signed by
the testator in his own hand. It may be signed by someone else
provided such signing is by the testator's direction and in his
presence. 9 It is further held that the fact that the testator can
write does not invalidate a signature by someone else.1 0 An
imperfect or ineligible signature may be good. In the case of
Ward v. Whipp,11 the testator signed his name to the will "A. J.
Whpps" instead of "A. J. Whipps." Such a mistake did not
render the will void as not subscribed with testator's signature
as required by the statute,
5 4 Metc. 163.
'Shanks v. Cristopher, supra.
IChrisholm v. Ben, 7 B. Mon. 408.
8 Sechrest v. Bdwaras, supra; Grubbs v. Marshal, 11 Ky. L. R. 870;
Garnett v. Foston, 122 Ky. 195, 91 S. W. 668.
"Savage v. Buiger, 25 Ky. L. R. 673, 77 S. W. 717.
10 Upchurch v. Upchurch, 16 B. Mon. 102.
16 Ky. L. R. 403, 28 S. W. 151.
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The statute12 prescribes that the signature of the testator
be placed at the "end or close of such writing," and it is not
deemed to be signed unless this is done. In Ward v. Putnam13
a will was held to be sufficiently subscribed where the signature
of the attesting witnesses were separated by a small space from
the signature of the testatrix, such space being taken up by the
written words "Signature," "Witness sign here," and "Sign
here." The court said in Lucas v. Brown'4 that the proper
place for the testator's signature is at the end, on the line fol-
lowing the testinomium clause; but that this does not necessarily
mean that the signature shall be in immediate juxtaposition to
the concluding words of the dispository provision. However it
does mean "that it should be sufficiently near to afford a reason-
able inference that the testator intended to indicate that his
testamentary dispositions had been fully and completely ex-
pressed." In Graham v. Edwards'5 the name of the testator
was written on a rule line which ran from top to bottom of the
paper, starting about one quarter of an inch from the bottom
thereof. This was held sufficient under the statute which pre-
scribes the signing "at the end."
An important question, touching on the place of signing,
came up for decision in the case of Sarah Mile's Will16 decided
in 1836. In this case the will commenced, "In the name of God,
amen, I, Sarah Miles," and ended "in ratification of which I
have hereunto set my hand and affixed my seal," adding a seal
without the name, and making an acknowledgment of the same.
This was held a snfficient signing. The principal authority
relied on in this case (this being the first case of its kind to come
up for decision before the Kentucky Court of Appeals) is the
English case of Leymojne v. Stanley.17 There the will began,
"I John Stanley," and was not otherwise signed. The next
case touching the question in the case of Sarah Mile's Will was
that of Allen v. Everett' s decided in 1851. The court here said,
"The name of a testator in the body of a will which he pub-
"Ky. St., sec. 468.
119 Ky. 889, 85 S. W. 179.
1"187 Ky. 502 (1920).
162 Ky. 771, 173 S. W. 127.
1 4 Dana 1.
213 Lev. 1.
12 B. Mon. 371.
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lished and caused to be witnessed in his presence, is a sufficient
signing." In the light of the later decisions in Lucas v. Brown,
supra, and Graham v. Edwards supra the weight carried by the
decisions in Sarah Mile's Will and Allen v. Everett has been of
decreasing importance.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Swift v. Wiley"9 has laid
down three general rules compliance with all of which is required
to constitute a good publication of a will; "First, signing by
the testator; second, attesting by two competent witnesses;
third, subscription by the witnesses in the testator's presence."
In Kentucky the order of time in which testator and witnesses
subscribe is not material provided that the witnesses are present
when the testator either writes his name or acknowledges it as
his signature. Swift v. Wiley, supra, is in point. Here a few
hours before his death the will was read to and approved by the
testator, and attested and subscribed by two witnessc in his
presence and at his request. Several hours later the testator sub-
scribed his own name in the presence of the same witnesses. The
court ruled that it was -unnecessary for the witnesses to again
sign after the testator had signed in order to give efficacy to the
will.
To render a will valid it is not necessary that the testator
should subscribe it in the joint presence of the attesting wit-
nesses.20 In Grubbs v. Marshall,21 the testator being unable to
write, had his name written by another, and made his mark in
the presence of one witness, and in the presence of another re-
traced his mark and acknowledged the instrument, but the two
witnesses were not together in the presence of the testator. Upon
first appearance this case seems to be overruled by the later case
of Limbach v. Bolin.22 A close analysis of the facts reveals that
the court has not reached inconsistent conclusions. In the
former case there was a signing and acknowledgment in the
presence of the first witness and an acknowledgment in the
presence of the second; while in the latter case at the time the
first witness signed the instrument, it had not been signed by
the testator and as a consequence could not be validly acknowl-
"2 1 B. Mon. 114.
20 Shanks v. Christopher, supra.
31 Note 1.
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edged. Here the witness never did see the testator sign; one
witness only saw him sign.
In the much cited case of -Upchurch v. Upchurch supra,
where a devisee, by whom the will had been written, at the re-
quest of two of three witnesses subscribed their names for them,
the court said, "Though the statute demands that the witnesses
shall subscribe the will with their names in the presence of the
testator, a literal compliance has not been exacted. The ob-
ject of the law in requiring subscription is to insure identity.
If the witnesses recognize the paper as the same paper which
they attested, this satisfies the requirements of the statute." In
Orndorff v. Hummer2= decided in 1851, a will was written, and
signed by the testator. Several hours later the witnesses came
into the room where the testator lay very ill. At that instant
the testator recognized them and appeared to be aware of their
mission, but at the moment when the witnesses were actually
engaged in signing the instrument the testator was in a state of
comma. The court held that the witnesses must be in view even
though they are in the same room with the testator, and in so
holding said, "If this be not requisite, the subscription by the
witnesses would be sufficient though made after the death of
the testator, or after he had relapsed in to perfect derilium, or
had become wholly insensible to external objects from the near
approach of death. And if this were sufficient the object of the
statute wouldbe fully accomplished if the will was subscribed a
year after the testator's death, or at any distance from his pres-
ence during his life." In the earlier case of Alsey Howard's
Wil 24 (1827), the court says that the attestation in the same
room with the testator is a subscription in his presence; but here
it was sworn by the witness that he subscribed the will at the
request of the testator, and in the same room without any effort
of concealment and while the testator was conscious, but in
Orndorif v. Hummer, where also no fraud at all was shown, the
reason for the opposite holding is based on the fact that the tes-
tator was not conscious at the time the witnesses were actually
engaged in the act of signing their names.
= Note 4.
2112 B. Mon. 619.
"145 B. SMon. 199.
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In the several states, the use of the words "attestation" and
"subscription" is somewhat confusing. However, this should
not be so in Kentucky. The court in Swift v. Wiley supra, says
that attesting m6ans more than barely subscribing the name to
the paper; it implies a knowledge of a publication and of the
facts necessary to legal publication. It is not sufficient that the
witnesses subscribe their names to a will as witnesses; they must
also attest the signature or acknowledgment of the will by the
testator.25 The attestation of the subscribing witnesses to a
will is to the genuineness of the testator's signature.26 Chief
Justice Robertson in delivering the opinion in Swift v. Wiley
said, "To attest the publication of a paper, as a last will, and
to subscribe to that paper the names of the witnesses, are very
different things, and are required for obviously distinct and
different ends. Attestation is the act of the senses, subscrip-
tion is the act of the hand; the one is mental, the other mechani-
cal; and to attest a will is to know that it was published as such,
and to certify the facts required to constitute an actual and
legal publication: but to subscribe a paper published as will, is
only to write on the same paper the names of the witnesses, for
the sole purpose of identification."
The attesting witnesses must be credible, but the statutory
meaning of the word "credible," when applied to witnesses at-
testing a will, is equivalent to "competent." '27  However, the
competency of attesting witnesses of instruments required by
law to be attested is not affected by the provisions of the Code2 s
relating to the competency of witnesses.
29
The law does not require that a will should be read by or
to the subscribing witness, nor that they should know its con-
tents. "It is not necessary that they should know that the
paper is a will," according to Justice Hines in Flood v. Pra-
groff.30 All that is required, is, that the paper should be identi-
fied by the witnesses, as that which they subscribed and that
they should prove that it was acknowledged by the testator, in
2Griffith v. Griffith, 5 B. Mon. 511.
Flood v. Pragroff, 79 Ky. 607.
SSherley v. Sherley, 7 Ky. L. R. 612.
'Sec. 606, Civil Code of- Ky.
"Mercer v. Macklin, 14 Bush 434.
0Note 26.
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their presence.31 These rulings show the understanding of the
court to be that the attestation is of the genuineness of the sig-
nature of the testator, and not of the contents of the paper.
The terms of our statute require that the will shall be sub-
scribed by at least two credible witnesses. The proof of a will
by one subscribing witness is sufficient to admit it to record, and
the fact, that two witnesses did attest it may be proved by one.3 2
This point is especially applicable where one of the subscribing
witnesses is dead or out of the jurisdiction. Where both of the
alleged subscribing witnesses are present, and one testifies as to
his subscribing but the other has no recollection whether or not
he signed the will, such will be deemed a good proof of attesta-
tion.3 3 In Carrico v. Nea 3 4 decided in 1833 it was held, where
one witness only of three witnesses, testified that it was his
"impression" that he subscribed, that such was not a sufficient
attestation. Where only one witness testifies, his evidence must
be direct, positive and explicit.
The interest of a witness in the subject of the devise may
invalidate the legacy or devise to him. This interest must ac-
crue directly to such witness. In Berry v. Hamilton35 the exe-
cutor appointed by a will devising lands and slaves was one of
the attesting witnesses. Here it was held that a remote in-
terest in the provisions of a will, did not disqualify the executor
from proving it, but affected his credibility only. The attest-
ing witness must have a greater interest than an ordinary trus-
tee, who receives a commission for his services ;.6 otherwise the
bequest or devise is good.
As to the physical act of signing by the witnesses, the courts
have construed the meaning of the terms of the statute with the
same degree of liberality and with practically the same limita-
tions as they have the physical act of signing by the testator.
The attesting witness may sign his name by mark and the same
will be valid provided the mark is made in the presence of the
In re Higdon, 6 J. J. Marsh. 444, 22 Am. Dec. 84.
"Hall v. Sims, 2 3. J. Marsh. 509; Uornielson v. Browning, 10
B. Mon. 425.
Gwine v. Radford, 2 Litt. 137.
1 Dana 162.
10 B. Mon. 129.
Orncdorf v. Hummer, supra.
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testator.3 7 One witness might hold and guide the hand of an-
other who cannot write; and the mark by a witness affixed to a
wrong surname will be deemed sufficient.38 In Montgomery v.
Perkins 9 it was held to be a substantial conformity with the
spirit of the statute where a draftsman wrote and subscribed
the witnesses' names; neither of them being able to write. The
particular place on the instrument at which the attesting -wit-
nesses affix their signatures is generally considered immaterial.
In this particular the holding in Kentucky is contrary to that
of the majority of the states. In Soward v. Saward,40 where
between the signature of the testator, and the names of the wit-
nesses, there was an intervening space of nearly two blank
pages, there was not a sufficient attestation. The court here
construed the word "subse'ribe," (either as to the testator or
the attesting witnesses) as meaning the signing of the instru-
ment beneath or at the end or foot thereof. The court said in
this connection that in all adjudications of the court, involving
the publication and attestation of wills, a substantial rather
than a literal compliance with the statute had been demanded,
but, at the same time, it could not be allowed an application so
extended and unlimited as to work a practical repeal of the
statute.
HARLAN HOBART GRooms.
3, Savage v. Bulger, note 9.
31 Wins. Exrs. 79, 3rd Am. Ed.
92 Mete. 448.
40 1 Duv. 127.
